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BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS: OPTIMISM AND CONCERN FROM THE U.S.
PERSPECTIVE
Christiana Ochoa
ABSTRACT
Forty-five years passed between the release of the first major United Nations report
referencing the need to regulate transnational corporations and the release of the Zero
Draft. Those years were accompanied by vibrant scholarly work and debate, as well as
a significant jurisprudence, corporate engagement, and civil society discourse and
activism that, cumulatively, has resulted in a much better understanding of how the
once very distinct ideas of “business” and “human rights” are now merged by an
ampersand. The field of business & human rights signifies the introduction of
polycentric governance and law that binds businesses, sometimes softly and sometimes
concretely, to take cognizance of international human rights. The work of the intrepid
scholars, judges, activists and individuals who have charted the course through the
vexing problems impeding the course from the 1970s and 80s to the current day is
largely recognized as completed, and this moment has been aptly called “the end of
the beginning” in the field of business and human rights.
It is in this context that this Essay will discuss both the casualties and laments of the
past forty-five years, as well as the grounding for optimism at this moment. This Essay
was prepared as a contribution to a conference on Corporate Accountability for
Human Rights Abuses and the Law held in Seoul, South Korea, in November 2018.
Because I was invited to focus my reflections on the role of, and perspectives from,
the United States, this Essay will rarely drift afield of these boundaries, though readers
should not lose sight of the intrinsically global and transnational nature of all issues
evoked by discussions on business and human rights.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1973, the United Nations released its first major report on multinational
corporations. 1 This report referenced, for the first time, the need to regulate
transnational corporations. Nearly 10 years later, the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations requested that an Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code
of Conduct on Transnational Corporations convene with the purpose of drafting such
a code.2 The Code of Conduct was never adopted and remains abandoned as a draft
in the archival history of Business & Human Rights. In 2004, it was joined there by
the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,3 when the Norms failed to garner the state
support necessary to progress further down the path from soft norms to harder law.
Finally, in 2005, the Sub-Commission of the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
(and later, Ban Ki-moon), appointed John Ruggie to the post of Special Representative
of the Secretary General on human rights and transnational corporations and other
business enterprises. His appointment ultimately resulted in the June 2011
endorsement of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights by the UN
Human Rights Council and the creation of a working group on business and human
rights that same year. In 2014, another Intergovernmental Working Group was
charged by the Human Rights Council with elaborating a draft treaty on business and
human rights.4 In the four years since, a vibrant debate has ensued on the value of the
Guiding Principles, their successes and failings, and the necessity and contents of a
binding treaty. On July 16 of this year (2018), the Intergovernmental Working Group
on the articulation of a business and human rights treaty (IGWG) produced the socalled Zero Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human
Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises (the “Zero Draft”).5
The forty-five years from the release of the first report on the subject to the release of
the Zero Draft have, of course, been accompanied by vibrant scholarly work and
debate, as well as a significant jurisprudence, corporate engagement, and civil society
discourse and activism that, cumulatively, has resulted in a much better understanding
See U.N. Dept. Econ. & Soc. Aff., MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT (1973). For a full
account of the negotiations surrounding the U.N. Code of Conduct, see Karl Sauvant, The Negotiations of the United
Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 16 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 11 (2015).
2 See Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 23 Int’l Legal Materials 626 (1984).
3 See Sub-Comm’n Res. 2003/16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L.11 at 52 (Aug. 13, 2013).
4 See Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (July 14, 2014).
5 See U.N., Human Rights Council, Intergov’tal Working Group on Transnat’l Corp. & Other Bus. Enterprises with
Respect to Hum. Rts., Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Zero Draft (July 16, 2018).
1
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of how the once very distinct ideas of “business” and “human rights” are now merged
by an ampersand that signifies the introduction of polycentric governance and law,
binding businesses, sometimes softly and sometimes concretely, to take cognizance of
international human rights. The work of the intrepid scholars, judges, activists and
individuals who have charted the course through the vexing problems impeding the
course from the 1970s and 80s to the current day is largely recognized as completed,
and this moment has been aptly called “the end of the beginning” in the field of
business and human rights.6
It is in this context that this Essay will discuss both the casualties and laments of the
past forty-five years, as well as the grounding for optimism at this moment. This Essay
was prepared as a contribution to a conference on Corporate Accountability for
Human Rights Abuses and the Law held in Seoul, South Korea, in November 2018.
Because I was invited to focus my reflections on the role of, and perspectives from,
the United States, this Essay will rarely drift afield of these boundaries, though readers
should not lose sight of the intrinsically global and transnational nature of all issues
evoked by discussions on business and human rights. In addition, the multiple
approaches to governance that have germinated in this field require that the Essay
provide only a cursory overview of the current state of play, rather than a thorough
exposition and theorization, of these innovations. This Essay will proceed by way of
an exposition of the most important governance tools currently under discussion in
the United States aimed at the prevention of and responsibility for human rights harms
by business enterprises. It will conclude by reflecting on the plurality of governance
tools that have arisen to address this complex and global area of scholarly and practical
interest.
During the early years of the United Nations’ exploration into the conduct of
transnational business activity, a transnational business engaged in a large-scale tort in
far-off places operated under fairly generalized legal impunity. This reality was made
possible by the combination of the ‘corporate veil’, together with a historically strict
application of extraterritoriality principles (prohibiting the laws and courts of one state
to reach into conduct occurring in another), and an absence of international human
rights law directly governing businesses. This environment of impunity resulted in an
assessment by business actors that the risk of participating in conversations about
conduct that violated modern notions of human and environmental rights was much
higher than the potential risks of abstaining from or denouncing these discussions.
Even as the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights was drafted, the International
Chamber of Commerce stood in clear opposition to the effort. Indeed, the United
See generally, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BEYOND THE END OF THE BEGINNING (Cesar A. Rodriguez Garavito
ed. 2017).
6
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States’ and ICC’s opposition was among the reasons the Norms failed to gain the
support of a sufficient number of states, and failed to be adopted.
II.

ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH LITIGATION

The absence of an international treaty was resonant with the absence of concrete
legal mechanisms for holding business actors accountable for violations of human
rights. Only in extraordinary circumstances were the home state courts of parent
companies willing to find that the acts of company subsidiaries, located in a different
state, could be scrutinized. The obstacles to such determinations – extraterritoriality
principles, doctrines maintaining the separate legal personality of the parents and
subsidiaries of corporations, and forum non conveniens – were significant.
A. United States Federal Courts
Starting in 1996, however, the Alien Tort Statute became the focal point for the effort
to use litigation to impose responsibilities for human rights harms on business actors
into a set of concrete legal claims, rather than merely a set of efforts to make hortatory
declarations through international institutions. In December 2004, just months before
the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General on human rights and
transnational corporations and other business enterprises (SRSG) was appointed, the
parties to Doe v. Unocal agreed to settle their case. The undisclosed settlement amount
was sufficient to “compensate plaintiffs and provide funds enabling plaintiffs and their
representatives to develop programs to improve living conditions, health care and
education and protect the rights of people from the pipeline region…[and to] provide
substantial assistance to people who may have suffered hardships in the region.”7 This
settlement was reached at a time when foreign defendants viewed the ATS with
optimism and were using the statute to bring a record number of claims against the
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations.8 In retrospect, it represented the high water
mark for ATS litigation.
As of April 2013, when the Supreme Court issued its decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.,9 not a single ATS claim had yielded a decision on the merits in favor of
the plaintiffs against a U.S. or foreign corporate defendant. Still today, after decades
of efforts by foreign plaintiffs, these cases have garnered little to no success in the
doctrinal jurisprudence of U.S. federal courts. The legal mechanisms of the corporate
veil,10 historical presumptions against extraterritorial application of U.S. law, and the
See Press Release, Earth Rights Int’l, Final Settlement Reached in Doe v. Unocal (Mar. 21, 2005) (on file with
organization).
8 See Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1518.
9 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
10 See, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) in which the Court suggested that U.S. courts may have personal
jurisdiction only over corporations incorporated or having their principle place of business in the U.S.
7

2018]

BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS: OPTIMISM AND CONCERN

7

doctrine of forum non conveniens 11 have held strong, such that the plaintiffs in the
corporate ATS cases continue to find no viable mechanism for redress in U.S. federal
courts. Indeed, there were four outstanding questions after Kiobel: questions related
to the court’s general and personal jurisdiction over defendants, questions relating to
the issue of “touch and concern” (i.e., how much conduct and of what character is
required for a U.S. corporation to be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts),
questions about whether aiding and abetting was sufficient involvement for liability
under the ATS, and questions about whether the ATS applied to corporations (or only
to individuals).12
There continue to be cases in U.S. federal courts alleging human rights harms by
corporate actors. In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC., the Supreme Court decided this final
question in April 2018 and insulated foreign corporations (and, depending on one’s
reading of the opinion, perhaps insulated U.S. corporations as well) from liability under
the ATS.13 In the time since the original corporate ATS cases in 1996, there have been
no final holdings in favor of plaintiffs in cases alleging human rights harms committed
by corporate actors and in the months since the Jesner decision, academic discussion
of the ATS bears the qualities of a funerary obituary. The funeral may be premature,
however. In October 2018, a three-judge panel of the United States Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that a suit brought on behalf of former child slaves can proceed
against Nestle and Cargill under the Alien Tort Statute for using former child slaves in
cocoa harvesting. The ruling allows for the possibility that a U.S. corporation may be
held liable under the ATS for aiding and abetting, and that the acts of Nestle and
Cargill in the United States may amount to aiding and abetting of child slavery in Ivory
Coast.14 The panel remanded the case “to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint [in
light of Jesner v. Arab Bank] to specify whether aiding and abetting conduct that took
place in the United States is attributable to the domestic corporations in this case.”15
The case may determine whether the ATS still has any life at all.
Since the Kiobel decision, and again since Jesner, a number of authors in the United
States have also asked where the claims making up corporate ATS litigation might
land, if not in U.S. federal courts. They have looked downward, upward, and sideways
and found potential venues in each of those locations.
See, e.g., Acuña-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp., 308 F.Supp.3d 812 (D. Del. 2018) (mem.), in which the
Delaware district court judge dismissed a case in which Peruvian farmers were seeking relief from alleged evictions
by Newmont Mining in the Yanacocha region of Peru. The dismissal was based on forum non conveniens.
12 See William S. Dodge, Business and Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts Before and After Kiobel, in BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE 244 (Dorothée Baumann-Pauly & Justine Nolan eds., 2016).
13 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC., 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018). See also Nowheresville (ft. Nina Totenberg), FIRST MONDAYS (Oct.
16, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/10/ot2017-3-nowheresville-ft-nina-totenberg/ (discussing, at some
length, the oral arguments before the Supreme Court).
14 Doe v. Nestle, 906 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2018).
15 Id.
11
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B. State Courts
Soon after Kiobel, Professors Stevens and Hoffman contributed an excellent synopsis
of the potential for state courts in the U.S. to hear claims by ATS-type plaintiffs.16 In
the years since, others have made important contributions to this discussion.17 Two
primary observations drive the view that state courts in the U.S. can serve as
appropriate venues for these cases.
First, “courts, commentators, and litigators have long recognized that the ATS affords
federal jurisdiction over common law claims that also fall within the jurisdiction of
state courts.”18 Second, every human rights violation can also be characterized as a tort
or set of torts. “Torture is assault and battery. Terrorism is wrongful death. Slavery is
false imprisonment.” 19 Importantly, state courts have jurisdiction over “transitory
torts” (claims arising outside of their territory), if the court has jurisdiction over the
defendant. State courts enjoy grants of general jurisdiction such that, as long as they
have jurisdiction over the particular defendant, state courts will have jurisdiction over
certain human rights claims for actions committed in a foreign location.20
Authors writing in the area argue persuasively that the Supreme Court’s restrictive
decisions in the ATS cases will push these cases into other courts and believe that U.S.
state courts are not foreclosed, and indeed have long been open, to human rights
claims that can be characterized as transitory torts. The states’ independent interests
in redressing tortious wrongs, these authors contend, have and do extend to human
rights violations. In the event that states are hearing claims characterized as violations
of international law, there remains a possibility that states’ interests in providing
remedies for these harms are outweighed by foreign relations concerns.21 Importantly,
cases before state courts would not impose limitations on liability for corporate actors,
nor for claims based on aiding and abetting, as both are firmly established in the tort
doctrines of every state in the United States.22
Roger Alford has made a similar observation, and argues that both state and federal
courts could continue to hear human rights claims framed as torts: in cases in which

See Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International Human Rights Cases under State Law and in State Courts, 3 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 9 (2013).
17 See Gwynne Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for Violations of International Human Rights
Norms by Transnational Business in a New (Post-Kiobel) World, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158 (2014). See also Seth
Davis & Christopher A. Whytock, State Remedies for Human Rights, 98 B.U. L. REV. 397 (2018).
18 See Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 16, at 10.
19 See Roger Paul Alford, Human Rights after Kiobel: Choice of Law and the Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, 63 EMORY
L.J. 1089, 1091 (2014).
20 See id. at 11. Davis & Whytock, supra note 17, at 430.
21 See Davis & Whytock, supra note 17, at 430.
22 See Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 16, at 18. Id. at 10.
16
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the United States has a strong interest in addressing the violation, domestic tort law
will apply, while in other cases, foreign tort law would apply.23
Not all scholars, and not all state courts, agree that this turn to state courts is a good
idea. Austen Parrish, for example, has argued persuasively that state law is not
appropriate for addressing human rights claims.24 Similarly, state courts will certainly
take a variety of views on this issue, and not all of them will be welcoming to such
claims.25
C. International Tribunals
Another potential avenue for redress for plaintiffs of at least a small set of human
rights harms may be the International Criminal Court. However, as readers will be
aware, the ICC’s own rules will restrict jurisdiction over all but the most egregious
claims, such as mass atrocities.26 The great majority of claims originally brought under
the corporate ATS litigation would fall outside of the ICC’s prevue.
D. Horizontal Solutions
Plaintiffs looking for legal accountability and redress have experimented with cases in
legal systems outside of the United States, with mixed success.27 In a small number of
cases in Canada and the European Union, plaintiffs have overcome the barriers of
forum non conveniens and corporate form. The Supreme Court of Canada, for example,
has cleared the way for a case against Tahoe Resources Inc. to be heard in Canadian
courts, despite defendant’s arguments that Guatemalan courts were the more
appropriate forum for the case.28 Similarly, in December 2015, a Dutch appeals court
held that Shell’s Dutch-based parent company could be held liable for the harms
resulting from an oil spill by its subsidiary in Nigeria, and that case is still proceeding.29
See Alford, supra note 20, at 1092.
But see, Austen L. Parrish, State Court International Human Rights Litigation: A Concerning Trend, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
25, 40 (2013).
25 See Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679 F.3d 205, 230 (4th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (asserting
that “there is no indication whatsoever that the Commonwealth of Virginia has any interest in having its tort law
applied abroad” in torture claim against private U.S. military contractors and emphasizing that “federal government
has exclusive power over foreign affairs”).
26 See Hannibal Travis, Reparations for Mass Atrocities as a Path to Peace: After Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
Can Victims Seek Relief at the International Criminal Court?, 40 Brook. J. Int’l L. 547 (2015).
27 See Gwynne Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for Violations of International Human Rights
Norms by Transnational Business in a New (Post-Kiobel) World, 46 COLUMBIA HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158 (2014).
28 See Supreme Court Clears Way for Lawsuit by Mine Protesters in Guatemala, CTV (June 8, 2017),
https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/supreme-court-clears-way-for-lawsuit-by-mine-protesters-in-guatemala1.3449292.
29 See Dutch Appeals Court Says Shell May be Held Liable For Oil Spills in Nigeria, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2015)
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/dec/18/dutch-appeals-court-shell-oil-spills-nigeria.
My co-panelist, Surya Deva, has contributed an excellent essay for this conference, further detailing developments
in the European Union.
23
24
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E. Creating New Causes of Action
Given the difficulty present in each of the litigation paths currently available, in U.S.
state and federal courts, in the courts of other countries, and in international tribunals,
scholars and advocates in the field of business & human rights have turned to the task
of entrenching new binding legal obligations on corporations, primarily the duty of
corporations to engage in human rights due diligence suggested by the Guiding
Principles. They argue for the legalization of a requirement to engage in human rights
due diligence which would be statutorily created and mandatory for all businesses,
including parent companies.
Douglass Cassel in the United States, for example, argues persuasively, in the context
of the Guiding Principles, for a “business duty of care to exercise human rights due
diligence, judicially enforceable in common law countries by tort suits for negligence
brought by persons whose potential injuries were reasonably foreseeable.”30 Gwynne
Skinner made similar arguments.31 This liability would extend to parents, as well as to
subsidiaries of corporations. Under this proposal, in the event that a corporation did
not exercise due diligence with respect to its human rights impacts, this would create
a rebuttable presumption of causation such that “a company could then avoid liability
only by carrying its burden to prove that the risk of the human rights violations was
not reasonably foreseeable, or that the damages would have resulted even if the
company had exercised due diligence.”32
This would be a significant benefit to future plaintiffs in U.S. courts, who currently
must demonstrate that the corporate form itself is being used in a fraudulent or
improper manner in order to cause a parent company to be liable for the acts of its
subsidiaries. It would also serve as a legal mechanism for the implementation of the
Guidelines, and perhaps for implementation of a future treaty.
III.

THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND TWO PATHS FORWARD

Well before the Guiding Principles were unanimously endorsed by the Human Rights
Council in 2011, there was widespread anticipation of what would follow that
endorsement. During the second phase of the SRSG’s work, many human rights
activists and some academic human rights lawyers criticized the emerging Guiding
Principles for not pointing toward international legalization. For this sector, a binding
See Douglass Cassel, Outlining the Case for a Common Law Duty of Care of Business to Exercise Human Rights Due Diligence,
1 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 179 (2016).
31 See Skinner, supra note 27.
32 See id.
30
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international treaty would represent, at the very least, an expressive victory on the issue
of business and human rights. For them, the pluralistic, soft law structure of the
Guiding Principles was never going to fulfill their expectations.
On the other hand, many of the countries and companies that participated in the
workshops and advisory sessions that resulted in the Guiding Principles did so
precisely because the methodology of the SRSG’s work and because the goal of the
Guiding Principles was that the responsibilities arising from them would be based on
the formation of global social norms,33 rather than a set of legal duties.34 This division,
which was largely smoothed over by the work of the SRSG and the Guiding Principles,
continues today, seven years after the Guiding Principles’ endorsement, and
reverberates through the international efforts regarding business responsibility for
human rights harms and it is characterized most concretely by the current efforts of
two distinct working groups charged by the Human Rights Council to make advances
in the area of business and human rights.
On June 26, 2014, the day after the Human Rights Council adopted a proposal put
forth by Ecuador to establish a working group charged with elaborating a treaty on
business and human rights (the open-ended intergovernmental working group on
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights
“OEIGWG”). The OEIGWG has met annually since the Ecuadoran proposal was
adopted and, in July 2018, released a draft text for discussion on a treaty on business
and human rights.35
The very next day, the Council adopted a resolution co-sponsored by forty-four
countries, extending the mandate of the expert working group established by the
Council in 2011 to build on and promote the General Principles (the Working Group).
This second resolution also requests the Commissioner for Human Rights to facilitate
a consultative process with states, experts, and other stakeholders exploring the “full
range of legal options and practical measures to improve access to remedy for victims
of business-related human rights abuses,” and asks the Working Group to report on
implementation of the Guiding Principles.36 The Working Group, made up of five
John Gerard Ruggie, Regulating Multinationals: The UN Guiding Principles, Civil Society, and International Legalization, in
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BEYOND THE END OF THE BEGINNING at fn 20 (César Rodriguez-Garavito, ed.,
2014) forthcoming, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2474236.
34 The settlement reached in Doe v. Unocal (supra note 8) altered the risk assessments of United States-based
corporations. The increased risk of litigation, together with John Ruggie’s inclusive methodology, caused the ICC
and many of the world’s largest corporations to accept, rather than resist, the SRSG’s overtures to participate in
the multi-stakeholder process that would result in the Guiding Principles. See id. at 12. See also JOHN GERARD
RUGGIE, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND ‘NEW GOVERNANCE THEORY’: LESSONS FROM BUSINESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 20 (2014) (describing the Guiding Principles’ process).
35 See supra note 5.
36 See id. Ruggie, supra note 33 at 10. Because the resolution was adopted by consensus, no vote was necessary. The
Working Group’s mandate was again renewed by consensus in 2017. See UN Document A/HRC/RES/35/7.
33
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independent experts, has a broad mandate that includes promoting the effective and
comprehensive dissemination and implementation of the Guiding Principles. Since it
was established in 2011, the Working Group has submitted ten issue-based reports to
the Council, as well as seven reports emerging from country visits. It has also
submitted numerous reports to the General Assembly and continues to study and
promote the implementation of the Guiding Principles. 37 The methodology of the
Working Group has, to date, been consistent with the methodology that led to the
development of the Guiding Principles. It is based on multi-stakeholder participation,
informed by field work and stakeholder consultation, as well as submissions and
reports on discrete human rights violations, and it aims to improve access to remedies
for victims of such harms.
The Working Group is also charged with facilitating and providing support for all
states to develop a national action plan on business and human rights. This is one of
the chief strategies for domestic implementation of states’ responsibility to
operationalize the Guiding Principles.
A. National Action Plans
Starting in 2013, the Working Group has consulted with governments, companies,
civil society, human rights institutions, and academics on the process and contents of
national action plans on business and human rights (NAPs). NAPs are described by
the Working Group as an “evolving policy strategy developed by a State to protect
against adverse human rights impacts by business enterprises in conformity with the
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Guiding Principles).”38 As of
October 2018, twenty-one countries have produced a NAP, twenty-three others are in
the process of developing a NAP or have committed to doing so, and governments or
civil society in nine additional countries have begun steps toward developing a NAP. 39

For a full catalogue of the Working Group’s charge and submissions, see generally Working Group on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS (last
updated
2018)
https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/business/pages/wghrandtransnationalcorporationsandotherbusiness.aspx.
37

See UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, GUIDANCE ON NATIONAL ACTION PLANS ON BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, at i., (2014).
39 For a list of the countries under each stage of NAP development, see generally State National Action Plans on Business
and
Human
Rights,
UNITED
NATIONS
HUMAN
RIGHTS
(last
updated
2018)
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx.
38
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The Working Group has produced guidance on NAPs,40 as have other organizations
such as the Danish Institute for Human Rights,41 and academics.42 While each of the
sources of guidance is different from the others in some form, they all have common
features including 1) recommendations for multi-stakeholder participation, 2)
recommendations for baseline assessments and analyses of the existing gaps between
the national baseline and the Guiding Principles, 3) calls for transparency both in the
formulation and monitoring of the NAPs, 4) the involvement of all relevant state
agencies, and 5) recommendations for ongoing monitoring and modification of the
NAPs. With respect to content, the sources of guidance also recommend that NAPs
1) express the State’s commitment to the principles and content of the Guiding
Principles, 2) contain as much of the form and content of the Guiding Principles as
possible, 3) offer time lines, commitments and metrics for measuring success, and 4)
contemplate capacity-building requirements of the state, civil society and private
sectors.
The United States produced its first NAP in December 2016, 43 after much of the
guidance cited herein was already available. The United States NAP conforms with
some of the recommendations discussed above, and is out of step with others, as will
now be discussed.
The United States’ NAP is commendable in some respects. The White House National
Security Council led and coordinated a multi-stakeholder process that included more
than a dozen federal agencies, as well as consultations with civil society organizations,
businesses and academics, labor unions, indigenous peoples representatives and
foreign governments.44 In addition, the U.S. government maintained an email address
for submissions related to the NAP from the public at large, which were collected but
never made public.45 The NAP lists a number of new actions which various agencies
within the government will undertake in order to effectuate the goals of the NAP. 46
Unfortunately, the praise for the U.S. NAP should probably stop there.

See id.
See National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights Toolkit (2017 edition), DANISH INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.humanrights.dk/publications/national-action-plans-business-human-rights-toolkit2017-edition.
42 See Damiano de Felice and Andreas Graf, The Potential of National Action Plans to Implement Human Rights Norms:
An Early Assessment with Respect to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 7 J. OF HMN. RTS. PRAC. 40
(2015).
43 See John Kerry, Responsible Business Conduct: First National Action Plan for the United States of America, U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.state.gov/e/eb/eppd/csr/naprbc/index.htm.
40
41

See id. at Annex I.
See id.
46 The NAP has a number of “New Actions” that can be found within each “Outcome” under the NAP. See id.
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With respect to the process for the development and monitoring of the NAP, the U.S.
model falls short. Although the NAP states that the development of the NAP
“included a stocktaking of laws and policies implemented to date that support
[responsible business conduct],” 47 the United States did not carry out a baseline
assessment, nor did it assess the gaps between the U.S. baseline and the Guiding
Principles. And, while the drafting process was arguably inclusive, it was not
transparent. In addition, the NAP was finalized during the last days of the Obama
administration. Information on the implementation of the NAP, and information on
the monitoring of the NAP in the United States, is scarce to non-existent. Indeed, the
NAP does not include any framework for monitoring or assessment of the
commitments made in the NAP, nor any timelines for assessments. Further, under the
new administration, it is unclear that either the Labor Department or the State
Department (the two Departments charged with the largest share of responsibilities
under the NAP) have taken any action in connection with the NAP since the new
administration took office, and there have been no reports to date on the United
States’ progress or compliance with its NAP.
With respect to the substance of the NAP, the Unites States NAP again bears some
positive and some disappointing features. While it does directly address particular
behaviors, such as human trafficking, child labor, corruption, transparency and the
role of the government in the supply chains implicated in public procurement, the
NAP is framed as part of the U.S. effort to promote “responsible business conduct.”
Human rights figure as just one of a set of issues addressed under the NAP, and the
Guiding Principles do not figure more prominently in the document than other
instruments, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.48 Still, the
NAP does address the Guiding Principles in stating that they “apply to all States and
business enterprises”49 and that the “U.S. government, through [the Department of]
State, will continue to disseminate the UN Guiding Principles through our bilateral,
multilateral, and public diplomacy efforts. State will continue to participate in and host
discussions…on these Guiding Principles, including through its on-going UN Guiding
Principles Workshop Series.”50
The U.S. NAP introduces very few new obligatory, regulatory actions and is, instead,
oriented heavily toward voluntary measures. Indeed, the new actions to be taken by
the government under the NAP are almost entirely voluntary, and the mandatory
regulatory actions included in the NAP are almost all on-going, rather than new. The
one exception is arguably the 2016 enactment of the Trade Facilitation Act of 2015,

See id. at Annex I.
See id. at 6.
49 See id. at 5; supra note 2.
50 See id. at 8.
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which has “removed an exception…that allowed for the importation of certain forced
labor-produced goods.”51
With respect to focusing on the most egregious human rights harms, the NAP focuses
specifically on child labor, human trafficking and forced labor but no other human
rights harms specifically. And, other than addressing child labor, the NAP does not
address the specific vulnerability of any other groups, such as women, indigenous
communities, LGBT people, or groups that are otherwise targeted because of their
political, religious, racial or cultural identities.
As stated previously, the NAPs contain no timelines or measurable outcomes or
metrics, largely because of the vagueness with which they were written. And, other
than stating new commitments under each section, the NAP does not discuss whether
the U.S. requires additional capacity building in order to promote and implement the
Guiding Principles, nor what steps might be taken toward such capacity building.
With respect to victims’ access to remedies for human rights harms, the U.S. NAP is
particularly disappointing. This is the shortest section of the NAP and includes no
ongoing commitments or initiatives. It makes no commitments for creating new
avenues for addressing harms, instead stating that it will “host stakeholder outreach
and explore with one or more advisory committee(s) as to how the U.S. government
can work with U.S. companies to help address concerns about the perceived lack of
accessible and effective remedy available to those who feel they have been negatively
impacted by U.S. business conduct abroad.”52 The only additional commitment under
the NAP relates to the U.S. National Contact Point created under the OECD
Guidelines. The U.S. commits to 1) undergo a peer review of its National Contact
Point, 2) create an outreach plan which will include stakeholders outside of the United
States, and 3) implement procedures for individuals who would like to file a complaint
through the USNCP process and do not speak English.53
The U.S. NAP falls short of best practice and it falls short of even the better existing
NAPs.54 For example, Germany and Scotland have both included baseline assessments
See id. at 9.
See id. at 23.
53 See id. The USNCP has considered fifty-five “Specific Instances” since June 2000. See, Specific Instance Final
Statement,
U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
(May
25,
2018),
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/oecd/usncp/specificinstance/finalstatements/index.htm (“Specific Instances” are
complaints of conduct by a business actor that are alleged by the complainant to be inconsistent with the OECD
Guidelines).
54 For an excellent synopsis and analysis of NAPs existing as of August 2017, see INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY ROUNDTABLE, ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING NATIONAL ACTION PLANS (NAPS) ON BUSINESS AND
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
AUGUST
2017
UPDATE
(Aug.
2017),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/583f3fca725e25fcd45aa446/t/599c543ae9bfdf40b5b6f055/15034174063
64/NAP+Assessment+Aug+2017+FINAL.pdf.
51
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as part of their NAP drafting process,55 the U.K. and Finland include information on
implementation and monitoring,56 and the U.K., Dutch, Danish and Finnish NAPs all
contain an explicit commitment to the full text of the Guiding Principles, including
the full range of human rights, as they apply domestically and extraterritorially.57
The content of the U.S. NAP is most disappointing, however, in light of its posture
toward the possibility of a treaty. As readers will recall, on June 26, 2014, the day before
the Human Rights Council adopted the resolution extending the mandate of the
Working Group, which has led to the further development of NAPs, the Council
adopted the Ecuadoran proposal to establish a working group charged with
elaborating a treaty on business and human rights. 58 The vote on the resolution
exposed the deep divisions among the voting countries regarding work toward a legally
binding instrument.59
B.

Treaty

The United States has stood in opposition to the elaboration of a treaty since the time
of Ecuador’s resolution. In addition to voting against the resolution, it also issued a
statement explaining its vote. The United States’ primary arguments against the
elaboration of a treaty were that: 1) the treaty effort is unduly polarizing, contradicting
the methods that led to the elaboration of the Guiding Principles; 2) the Guiding
Principles, while contributing to improvements in the field of business and human
rights, have not been given sufficient time to be fully implemented; 3) the treaty
process will be a threat to the Guiding Principles, creating confusion and competition
with their voluntary implementation; 4) a treaty is unlikely to handle the complexity of
regulating business activity; 5) a treaty will only be binding on the states that become
party to it; 6) the treaty elaboration process will not include key stakeholders, including
the private sector; and 7) practical concerns, such as how the treaty will apply to private
actors, and how states will implement such a treaty.

See Claire Methven O’Brien, Amol Mehra, Sara Blackwell & Cathrine Hansen, National Action Plans: Current Status
and Future Prospects for a New Business and Human Rights Governance Tool, 1 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 117, 126-27 (Aug. 7,
2015).
56 See id. at 124.
57 See id. at 122.
58 Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev. 1 (June 24, 2014).
59 The vote was twenty in favor (Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, China, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, India,
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Venezuela,
Vietnam), fourteen against (Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Montenegro, South Korea, Romania, Macedonia, UK, USA) and thirteen abstentions (Argentina, Botswana,
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Gabon, Kuwait, Maldives, Mexico, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, UAE). See UN
Human Rights Council Sessions, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, https://www.businesshumanrights.org/en/binding-treaty/un-human-rights-council-sessions (last visited, Oct. 27, 2018).
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The United States clearly stated that it would vote no to the resolution, that it would
not participate in a treaty elaboration process, and that it would encourage others to
do the same.60 The United States’ position has not changed. At the most recent session
of the IGWG, the United States did not participate, stating that it “remains opposed
to the treaty process and the manner in which it has been pursued.”61
Importantly, the United States is not alone in its opposition to the treaty process. In
addition to the other countries that have opposed the treaty process since its start, the
International Organisation of Employers, Business at OECD, Business Europe, and
the International Chamber of Commerce, which together represent millions of
companies globally and which have (unlike the United States) participated in the treaty
process, also currently stand united in their opposition to the treaty process.62
On July 16, 2018, the Chair of the OEIGWG released the Zero Draft Legally Binding
Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (the Zero Draft Treaty)63
and the Draft Optional Protocol to the Legally Binding Instrument (the Draft
Optional Protocol),64 which are to be the focus of future negotiations on the treaty.
The business organizations cited above published a response to the Zero Draft that
declares their belief that the Zero Draft Treaty and Optional Protocol “do not provide
a sound basis for a possible future standard on business and human rights.” 65 The
response includes concerns about both the process and the substance of the Zero
Draft Treaty and states, ominously, that the draft “takes the business and human rights
agenda backwards by undermining the Guiding Principles and exacerbating the failure
See Proposed Working Group Would Undermine Efforts to Implement Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, U.S.
MISSION
TO
INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
IN
GENEVA
(June
26,
2014),
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2014/06/26/proposed-working-group-would-undermine-efforts-to-implementguiding-principles-on-business-and-human-rights/.
61 See The United States’ Opposition to the Business and Human Rights Treaty Process, U.S. MISSION TO INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN GENEVA (Oct. 15, 2018), https://geneva.usmission.gov/2018/10/15/the-united-statesopposition-to-the-business-and-human-rights-treaty-process/.
62 See The Global Voice of Business, International Chamber of Commerce, Business at OECD & Business Europe,
Business Response to the Zero Draft Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (“Zero Draft Treaty”) and the Draft Optional Protocol to the Legally
Binding Instrument (“Draft Optional Protocol”) Annex, (Oct. 2018) [hereinafter “ICC Response”],
https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2018/10/icc-joint-business-response-zero-draft-2018.pdf.
63 See United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in
International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transactional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN
RIGHTS
COUNCIL
(July
16,
2018),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/DraftLBI.pdf.
64 See United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Draft Optional Protocol to the Legally Binding
Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises
(Sept.
4,
2018),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session4/ZeroDraftOPLegally.P
DF.
65 See ICC Response, supra note 62, at 2.
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of States to meet their existing obligations.”66 This resonates strongly with the United
States’ current view.
While the United States’ and ICC’s opposition to the Zero Draft Treaty may primarily
rest in the U.S. and ICC resistance to useful hard-law mechanisms that could
potentially lead to legal liability for businesses engaging in human rights violations, the
Zero Draft Treaty is characterized by some significant design flaws that have drawn
criticism from a wider variety of stakeholders.
For example, Greenpeace International has critiqued the Zero Draft Treaty for
addressing only states’ obligations under human rights law, rather than extending
direct responsibility for human rights harms to business enterprises, thus retrenching
the idea that private actors cannot be subjects under international law in the business
and human rights context. It further criticizes the Zero Draft Treaty for focusing solely
on transnational activities of corporations, and not the domestic harms caused by
corporations. Finally, the Zero Draft Treaty is critiqued for not creating either new
domestic or international tribunals or mechanism for addressing human rights harms.67
Other advocacy organizations have critiqued the Zero Draft Treaty and Draft
Optional Protocol for not adequately addressing the problems of forum non conveniens
and piercing the corporate veil discussed earlier in this essay, and for not establishing
sufficiently strong institutions to receive and address complaints of human rights
harms.68
John Ruggie, the author of the Guiding Principles, has repeatedly made clear his view
that “legalization is a necessary and inevitable component of future developments.”69
However, he has also repeatedly expressed his skepticism that the current treaty
process will produce the most benefit to the communities and individuals most
affected by human rights harms. He reminds us that calls for a treaty to regulate
transnational corporations date back to the 1970s, with each effort resulting in failure
after being met with vigorous opposition from the business sector.70 Given the strong
See id. at 5.
See Gabriela Kletzel & Andrés López Cabello, Toothless Tool? First Impressions on the Draft Optional Protocol to the
Legally Binding Instrument on Business and Human Rights, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE (Oct. 11,
2018),
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/a-toothless-tool-first-impressions-on-the-draft-optionalprotocol-to-the-legally-binding-instrument-on-business-and-human-rights.
68 See Gabriela Kletzel, Andrés López Cabello, Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales & Daniel Cerqueira, Due
Process of Law Foundation, A Toothless Tool? First Impressions on the Draft Optional Protocol to the Legally Binding
Instrument on Business and Human Rights, BLOG: FIRST IMPRESSIONS ON THE DRAFT OP-PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY
ON BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS (OCT. 13, 2018), https://www.escr-net.org/news/2018/blog-first-impressionsdraft-optional-protocol.
69 See John Gerard Ruggie, Regulating Multinationals: The UN Guiding Principles, Civil Society, and International Legalization,
at 7 (Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University,
Working
Paper
No.
RPP-2015-04,
2015)
(July
30,
2014),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/RPP_2015_04_Ruggie.pdf.
70 See id. at 1.
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opposition from the business sector and the deep divisions from states regarding the
process described above, one must wonder what the future of this treaty effort might
be. But, Ruggie’s concerns lie beyond just the likelihood of failure. He is also
concerned that, even if the treaty process ultimately results in a vote on the treaty, the
process leading to that result could take a decade or longer (it has already been four
years, after all). What, he asks, do treaty supporters “propose to do between now and
then – whenever then may be? The obvious answer should be to implement and build
on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.”71
Further, Ruggie has expressed the view that the field of business and human rights
“encompasses too many complex areas of national and international law for a single
treaty instrument to” address the full range of human rights, even if international law
remained static, which it does not.72 Even in his most recent, and most optimistic
analysis of the Zero Draft Treaty, Ruggie continues to cite to structural design failures
in the Zero Draft Treaty, such as its failures to recognize the sheer scale of
transnational business activity, the problem of how to monitor this activity, and how
to determine who should be liable for human rights harms under the treaty.73
Despite the criticism the Zero Draft Treaty has attracted, it also has garnered support
from a large number of experts, even if that support is cautious. During October 2018,
a group of [over 160] scholars and experts signed an “open letter to states concerning
an international legally binding instrument on business and human rights.”74 While this
letter recognizes the divisions that exist between states regarding the treaty effort, it
also urges states to fill the regulatory gaps left by existing efforts through the creation
of a legally binding instrument.75 The open letter, and the available commentary to
date, provide a sense that many commentators have come to the view that the Zero
Draft Treaty “is on the right track,” 76 even if just for the purpose of keeping the
dialogue about an internationally binding instrument alive.
See id. at 10 (He notes that, unfortunately, many of the countries and NGOs supporting the treaty process have
done very little to implement and promote the UN General Principles.).
72 See id. at 11.
73 See John G. Ruggie, Comments on the “Zero Draft” Treaty on Business & Human Rights”, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS
RESOURCE
CENTRE,
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/comments-on-the-%E2%80%9Czerodraft%E2%80%9D-treaty-on-business-human-rights (last visited Nov. 29, 2018). For resonant commentary, see
Carlos Lopez, Towards an International Convention on Business and Human Rights, Parts I and II, OPINIOJURIS (July 23,
2018), http://opiniojuris.org/author/carlos-lopez/.
74 See An Open Letter to States Concerning an International Legally Binding Instrument on Business and Human Rights, BUSINESS
&
HUMAN
RIGHTS
RESOURCE
CENTRE
(OCT.
1,
2018),
https://www.businesshumanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Open%20Letter%20to%20States%20%281%20Oct%202018%
29.pdf.
75 See id. (Letter in support of continued work on the zero draft has approximately 160 signers).
76 See Doug Cassel, At Last: A Draft UN Treaty on Business and Human Rights, LETTERS BLOGATORY (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://lettersblogatory.com/2018/08/02/at-last-a-draft-un-treaty-on-business-and-human-rights/#more-27105
(For Cassel, one of the most promising aspects of the Zero Draft, in article 9.2, hones in on the requirement that
companies exercise human rights due diligence and, in article 9.4, provides that companies that fail to comply with
their due diligence duties will face “commensurate liability and compensation” obligations).
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In October 2018, the Fourth Session of the Intergovernmental Working Group
resolved to continue work on the Zero Draft. To that end, comments on the Zero
Draft Treaty will be received until the end of February 2019, and a new draft will be
released by the end of June 2019.77
IV.

CONCLUSION: THE MORE THINGS CHANGE…

Such a rapid tour of the current state of play of court-based, agency-based, and
international law-based efforts toward the prevention of and remediation for human
rights harms may understandably leave a reader with a sense that, despite the fortyfive years of work on the global, national and local scale, business actors still enjoy the
same level of impunity they as when the United Nations issued its first reports on the
topic. To date, there is no reliable, transparent path to litigation against business actors
alleged to have committed human rights harms; there is no instrument in international
law binding states (much less private actors) to protect, respect, or remedy human
rights harms committed by business actors; and, while the business community and
the United States may have shifted slightly, they continue to hold a very similar posture
regarding such a legally binding instrument as they have since the Code of Conduct
and the Norms were drafted. In these respects – as it pertains to legally binding reliable
access to viable remedies – indeed, nothing has changed.
Still, to conclude that the field of business and human rights has failed to change would
be to overlook the tremendous data and understanding collected through the
innovations of the Global Compact and the work leading to the Guiding Principles,
not to mention the B-Corp Movement, the Equator Principles, the proliferate
voluntary codes governing nearly every large industry, the creation of NAPs in an everlarger number of States, the domestic legislation and press-garnering litigation in most
of the world’s most important home-state jurisdictions, the advancement of the
language of human rights inside of the world’s economic order, and, most importantly,
the popular awareness that has come to surround the activities of business actors.
These phenomena, viewed cumulatively, significantly bear on the evolving legal
landscape for business actors. Indeed, transnational corporations and other business
actors now find themselves enmeshed in a fabric of social and economic responsibility
that has emerged throughout the past half century. This is the stuff of emerging social
norms and, over time, the formation of legitimate law.78
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